{"id":384405,"date":"2024-08-16T10:30:29","date_gmt":"2024-08-16T14:30:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/qa.bluevaultpartners.com\/?p=384405"},"modified":"2024-09-03T11:19:23","modified_gmt":"2024-09-03T15:19:23","slug":"the-dividends-of-policy-divergence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/qa.bluevaultpartners.com\/the-dividends-of-policy-divergence\/","title":{"rendered":"The dividends of policy divergence"},"content":{"rendered":"
Christopher M. Chapman, CFA<\/a> | John Hancock\u00a0<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n \u2022 \u00a0Interest-rate policy divergence continues to be a source of duration opportunity for actively managed fixed-income investors.<\/p>\n \u2022 \u00a0We think attractive credit opportunities are still possible to find, especially when investors adopt a research-based approach.<\/p>\n \u2022 \u00a0The U.S. dollar will likely continue to be the reserve currency of choice for years to come, despite the so-called trend of de-dollarization.<\/p>\n From the vantage point of August 2024, the inflation pressures of recent years have declined substantially. Central banks, after their period of tighter policy, pivoted to a wait-and-see mode\u2014and now are pivoting once again as they\u2019ve begun to drive policy rates lower.<\/p><\/div>\n In other words, we can express our favorable view on interest-rate risk by actively managing portfolio duration, tactically embracing divergences in policy when and where we have conviction.<\/p>\n The policy-driven duration opportunities we see are just a part of the story underscoring the merits of a global fixed-income approach. An additional part, among others, is the active role of asset allocation in managing credit risk.<\/p>\n At the moment, conditions in global fixed income are much more favorable from the perspective of income generation than they were in recent years. Gone are the days of zero cash rates and negative-yielding fixed-income instruments. But that doesn\u2019t mean risk is no longer a real concern; on the contrary, we believe it\u2019s beginning to matter more where investors are finding sources of yield.<\/p>\n Now more than at any point so far in the present economic cycle, we believe investors must be thoughtful about where yield is sourced\u2014particularly in riskier segments of corporate credit, such as U.S. high yield. While we believe there are attractive opportunities here, valuations warrant being more thoughtful: Beyond yield, what’s a debt holder getting in terms of issuer quality, security covenants, and sector strength?<\/p>\n As of late July, the spread between the ICE BofA U.S. High Yield Index versus 10-year U.S. Treasuries was approximately 300 basis points (bps). Over the last 20 years, that spread has averaged closer to 500bps. Put another way, spreads have been wider than they are now roughly 90% of the time over the past two decades, which indicates the relative expensiveness of U.S. high-yield bonds today.<\/p>\n This is another reason why we believe being an active investor now is so critical. In addition to being able to take advantage of policy rate divergence, an active approach to asset allocation and credit selection can help investors avoid the minefield of spread widening. In other words, a risk-aware fundamental approach may help global bond investors continue to enjoy the benefits of diversification without incurring an inordinate amount of pain from bond market volatility.<\/p>\n In recent quarters, investors may have seen headlines<\/a> around governments wishing to move away from the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of choice. This has occasionally prompted questions about the potential role currency risk<\/a> plays within a global bond allocation. This perennial topic has reemerged in the context of so-called de-dollarization, which is a variably supported trend of certain governments expressing a desire to participate in global trade in their own currencies.<\/p>\n Currency composition of global foreign exchange (FX) reserves, 2016\u20132024 Q1 (%)<\/p>\n De-dollarization is, in fact, happening, but it\u2019s in no way a near-term threat to the U.S. dollar\u2019s status as a reserve currency. Consider, for example, the composition of central bank reserves, which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) tracks through its composition of official foreign exchange reserves. As the IMF’s data shows<\/a>, the U.S. dollar was a little bit over 70% of the total weight of those reserves in 1999; more recently\u2014from 2021 through the first quarter of 2024\u2014that weight had declined to slightly below 60%. But then consider the next largest currency within that balance: the euro at 21%. At that level, we can easily see that the U.S. dollar still has a healthy lead over other currencies.<\/p>\n When we look at where reserves have moved, we find they\u2019ve been spread across a variety of different currencies. Some of the balance has gone to the dollar bloc\u2014including the Australian dollar, the New Zealand dollar, and the Canadian dollar\u2014and some has gone to Asian currencies, such as the Korean won and the Singapore dollar and, of course, to the Chinese renminbi.<\/p>\n When politically charged thinking gets involved in the question of the U.S. reserve currency status, people point to the Chinese renminbi. And it has risen\u2014from about zero to about 2.5% to 3%. So, again, there’s still an enormous difference between the U.S. dollar and the renminbi.<\/p>\nKey takeaways<\/h4>\n
Active duration management matters once again<\/h4>\n
Looking beyond yield for better credits<\/h4>\n
Source: The Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Bank of America (BofA) U.S. High Yield Index tracks the performance of below-investment-grade U.S. dollar-denominated corporate bonds publicly issued in the U.S. domestic market and includes issues with a credit rating of BBB or below. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n
No regime change when it comes to reserve currencies<\/h4>\n
Source: International Monetary Fund, March 31, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n